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Tiger, Tiger, Burning Bright?1 Industrial Policy Lessons  
from Ireland and East Asia for Small African Economies 
 
 
David Bailey, Helena Lenihan and Ajit Singh2 
 
 
“… capitalism is not a system given to stasis. What works in one period is 
unlikely to work in the next; and even when it ‘works’, its distribution of 
costs and benefits is never socially equal. So when deciding which tiger to 
ride, it is worth remembering that the choice is only between tigers, and 
that if a safe ride is what you want, you would do well not to ride tigers at 
all”.   (Coates, 2007; 193). 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The African economies, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stand 
today at an important crossroads. During the 1980s, for the average African 
country, GDP per capita fell at a rate of 0.5 percent per annum; in the 1990s it 
rose slightly at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum (see Table-1). However, in the 
last four years, the average growth rate of this variable has been a respectable 3 
percent per annum. In 2007, GDP growth rate in Africa was estimated to be 6 
percent per annum, one of the highest rates recorded during any year over the 
last quarter century. Apart from indicating the recent recovery in African 
economic growth, the table also highlights the poor long term performance of the 
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African economies relative to other developing countries. Over the entire 26 year 
period, 1981-2007, for which the data are presented in the table, per capita GDP 
in African countries rose only by 16 per cent. compared with more than a 100 per 
cent. rise for all developing countries. For the East and South Asian economies, 
the growth in GDP per capita has been spectacular, a rise of well over 300 per 
cent. 
 
Table 1. 
 
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH BY REGION AND 
ECONOMIC GROUPING, 1981-2007 
(Per Cent) 
     Average annual  Overall 
     Growth   growth 
    _______________________    
______________________ 
    1981- 1990-   2003-   1981- 
    1989    2002     2007             2007 
 
World    1.4 1.2 2.3   41.4 
 
Developed economies 2.5 1.8 2.08   67.5 
 
Economies in transition 1.9 -4.0 7.3   -25.8 
 
Developing economies 1.7 3.0 5.0             112.5 
Of which: 
 
 Africa   -0.5 0.3 3.0   16.4 
 America  -0.3 1.1 3.5   22.7 
 West Asia  -1.7 1.1 4.1   16.0 
 East and South Asia 5.1 5.3 6.3               317.5 
 
 
Source:  UNCTAD (2007). 
 
It is very much a moot point whether this recent reversal of fortunes for the 
African countries has been due to the late success of structural adjustment 
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programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF, as is implicitly claimed by 
the two Bretton Woods institutions [World Bank (2007), IMF (2008)]. These 
programmes, which have been the dominant influences on Sub Saharan African 
economies during much of 1980s and all of 1990s, have embodied the 
Washington Consensus and its aftermath. According to independent economists 
[UNCTAD (2005), and (2007), ILO (2007), Mickenley (2005) and Lall (2005)], 
although many countries implemented these programmes, there has not been 
much success in enhancing their economic growth on a sustained basis. Indeed 
Thandika Mkandawire (2005), a leading scholar of African economies argues 
persuasively that the SAPs were in fact counterproductive and often led to the 
wrong kind of structural change which would hinder rather than help economic 
development. 
 
The most plausible reason for the fast growth of African economies in the last 
four years would appear to be the huge increase in international commodity 
prices. Information provided by UNCTAD (2007) reveals how the prices of 
various commodities have changed over this period: 
 
World PrimaryCommodity Prices, 2002-2006 (Percentage Change) 
Commodity group 2002-2006 
Food and Tropical Beverages 48.4 
Agricultural raw materials 62.3 
Minerals,ores and metals 219.9 
Crude petroleum 157.6 
 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Commodity Price Bulletin, various 
issues, and UNSD, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.  Adapted from UNCTAD (2007). 
 
The increased value of SSA exports as a result of the commodity price rise 
helped to relax the balance of payments constraint which in turn led to faster 
growth. The central issue is whether or not the African countries can translate 
this recent improved performance into sustained, fast, long term economic 
growth. Here the economic history of these countries in the last half century does 
not provide much ground for optimism. The good record of African economic 
growth between 1950 and 1973 when these economies expanded at a rate of 
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nearly 5 per cent. per annum could not subsequently be sustained. Similarly, 
during the 1990s a number of countries were successively selected as the 
‘African success stories’ by the Bretton Woods institutions, none of which could 
actually maintain fast growth for more than 2-3 years (Mkandawire, 2005). Such 
economic history invites scepticism about the ability of African countries to 
convert their recent favourable changes in the terms of trade into lasting 
progress. The case of the sceptics is straightforward. Apart from all the other 
handicaps, the African countries have been further debilitated by two decades of 
stagnation or worse; and are therefore unlikely to achieve fast long term growth. 
 
There are however important counter arguments which are equally an essential 
part of the story. The African countries are today much better equipped for 
initiating and sustaining fast growth, with a far greater endowment of human and 
material resources than they were 25 years ago. 
 The educational level of Africa’s citizens is much higher today than it was 
in the early 1970s. This is particularly notable at the tertiary level. There 
were for example only 7 university graduates in Tanzania in 1964 at the 
time of the country’s independence from British colonial rule. Today, after 
independence there are literally thousands, as a result of the 
establishment of the University of Dar-e-Salam, a splendid institution of 
higher education.  
 There is a network of science and research institutions, engineering 
colleges, throughout the continent. A number of business schools have 
also been established and there is close collaboration between the 
African and the best business schools in the US and the UK 
(Pfeffermann, 2008). 
 There are signs of an emerging middle class in the African countries. 
There is evidence also of the evolution of entrepreneurship in these 
countries (ibid.). 
 Moreover, as The Economist (2008) notes, “an unexpected and 
overlooked continent may benefit from its very isolation” (p.33).  It 
Deleted: w
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suggests by way of illustration that African banks are normally regarded 
as being very conservative and excessively regulated.  ‘Now, however’ 
observes The Economist (2008), “this very de-linkage from the Western 
financial system has turned out to Africa’s advantage.  It’s banks have 
almost no exposure to the sub-prime market causing such havoc 
elsewhere…” (p.33). 
 
With the above background, this paper considers the question of industrial policy 
for African countries and what lessons they can draw from the experience of 
other countries. As latecomers to industrialization, the African countries are well 
placed to carry out such an exercise.  Economic history of the last half century 
indicates that whereas industrial policy has been highly successful in some 
countries, it has been equally unsuccessful in others.  The African countries 
would wish to draw appropriate lessons from both sets of countries.  There is, 
however, a prior question which they obviously need to consider.  Should they 
have an industrial policy at all?  Here the experience of the East and South East 
Asian countries does indicate that industrial policy has played a key role in the 
extraordinary success of these economies in recent decades.3  In addition to this 
there is another related and powerful reason for African countries to examine 
closely the experience of Asian countries.  Many countries in the two regions at 
the time of independence from colonial rule had broadly similar economic 
structures and income levels. To illustrate, in the 1950s around the time of the 
country’s independence, Malaysia’s economy was much like that of Ghana, 
based on exports of primary agricultural commodities, rubber in the case of 
Malayasia and cocoa in relation to Ghana. Both countries shared the common 
legacy of British colonial rule.  However, today, the Malayasian per capita income 
is nearly 5000 USD at current exchange rates and 10,000USD at PPP rates, 
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while the Ghanian per capita income has risen very little over the same period. It 
is legitimate to ask how can one account for such a difference in the evolution of 
the two economies? Was it, for example, simply due to the fact that the Ghanian 
economy was subject to greater economic shocks than Malaysia’s? There is little 
empirical support for this hypothesis. Moreover, a large number of other East and 
South Asian countries also did very well using industrial policy and outperformed 
most African countries. For these reasons comparisons of African countries with 
East and South Asian countries are commonly made and are useful.  However, 
in this paper we briefly consider the experience of East Asian countries with 
industrial policy, but give detailed  attention to Ireland as a comparator and 
present the reasons for doing so.  
 
The next section briefly explains in general terms why Ireland is an interesting 
comparison for African countries and why lessons from the Irish experience will 
be useful. Sections 3 to 8 will discuss in much greater detail the role of industrial 
policy in a broad sense as well as other important factors in the development of 
the Irish economy, together with the lessons for African countries. Section 9 re-
examines the case of East Asian countries as role models for economic 
development for African countries. Section 10 concludes.  Close attention to the 
Irish case does not of course imply that other countries’ experiences are less 
important or less relevant, but we believe that Ireland’s experience with industrial 
policy does have useful and significant implications for Africa.  Nevertheless, for 
African countries, at a practical policy level, we would like to endorse the caution 
from Professor Karl Aginger, one of the leading industrial policy economists in 
Europe.  Aginger (2007) notes that: ‘industrial policy is one of the most 
controversial policy fields.  Its scope, instruments and rationale vary across 
countries, changing over time; intentions and outcomes often differ’ (p. 143). 
 
2. Why is Ireland an Interesting Comparison? 
When Ireland joined the then ‘Common Market’ in 1973, the economy was in 
many senses a small, poor, peripheral and agriculturally dominated economy 
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with an overdependence on links to its former colonial master, the UK. Trade was 
limited given ongoing protectionism (the European Union (EU) in particular had 
yet to fully open up). In under three decades, however, the Irish economy has 
transformed itself from being one of the four cohesion countries of the EU to 
being considered an advanced high-tech enclave of the EU. 
 
There are also other reasons for using the Irish example: 
 Ireland, like most African countries is a small economy. It has the 
geographical size of Sierra Leone as well as a similar population. Given 
its small size, clearly the membership of the EU has played a major role 
in the evolution of the Irish success story. Apart from providing a far 
bigger market for Irish products so as to be able to reap the economies 
of scale, EU has also provided Ireland with very large direct assistance 
for the development of its infrastructure. What could take the place of 
EU even in a limited sense in the present context of small African 
countries? This issue will be taken up further below. 
 
 Although Ireland is far from being a laissez-faire economy it is by no 
means as ‘dirigiste’ as the East and the South Asian countries. It is 
more corporatist than the East Asian countries. The unions play a major 
role in the determination of wages and prices. Compared with the East 
Asian model it is therefore more likely to be directly relevant to the 
African countries. The East and South Asian pattern of development is 
heavily dependant on the outstanding qualities of the civil service. Such 
qualities are not simply inherited but are developed alongside the 
expansion of the economy (see Chang, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
corporatist model makes comparatively less demands on administrative 
capacity. 
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 It is arguable that the African countries would have more to learn from 
the experience of the operation of industrial policies in Ireland than in 
the East and South Asian countries. The Irish industrial policy did not 
involve measures of coercion in the allocation of resources in the way it 
did in the case of East Asian countries during the prime of their 
industrial policy, for example, Japan between 1950 to 1973, and Korea 
between 1970 to 19904. It will be recalled that in Japan during this 
period the government used the allocation of foreign exchange in 
coercive ways as a principal weapon to meet government’s targets for 
specific firms and industries. Similarly in Korea during its main industrial 
policy period, there is evidence of coercion in the expansion and 
upgrading of country’s exports by the large conglomerates which the 
government itself had created (see Amsden (1989,1994), Amsden and 
Singh (1994), Singh (1995,1998), Chang (2006)). 
 
 It should not be forgotten that during the operation of industrial policy in 
a number of East Asian countries, industrial ‘peace’ was ensured 
through the suppression of trade union rights. Some would argue that 
this alone makes the Irish example more suitable as a role model for 
African countries. 
 
The following sections examine in more detail the operation of industrial and 
developmental policies in Ireland and their relevance for African countries.    
 
3. SMEs in Ireland and in African Countries 
The relative similarity in economic experiences between the Irish case in the (not 
too distant) past and that of the small African states today warrants research to 
provide insights as to whether Ireland can regarded as a worthwhile case study, 
especially around the development of small and medium sized enterprises 
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(SMEs) given their importance in both Ireland and small African states. Of 
relevance here, some characteristics of Irish SMEs can be noted: 
(1) Irish SMEs were focussed primarily upon the home market. Indeed, 
export oriented SMEs were an uncommon occurrence in the Ireland of 
the 1970s.  
(2) Ireland’s small manufacturing firms in the past were mostly found in 
traditional industries such as  food;  beverages and tobacco; textiles and 
wood products.  These industries were characterised by low productivity, 
skills and research and development (R&D).    
(3) Small firms in Ireland were then faced with similar barriers as small firms 
in Africa today (albeit on a different scale), namely: financial barriers 
(particularly at the business start-up stage);
 
and poor macroeconomic 
conditions as well as a poor business environment.   
 
On the latter point, several studies on the barriers encountered by small firms in 
Ireland have pointed to access to finance as being the single most critical issue 
(Forfás 1994; Goodbody Economic Consultants 2002; Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 2001).  Very recent work on the Irish case shows that small businesses 
continue to experience difficulties in obtaining appropriate levels of finance for 
start-up and growth (Small Business Forum, 2006).  This finding has been 
reiterated in recent work with regard to small firms in Africa (see below).  
 
Until recently, there has also been no well–defined, structured or focussed  
policy for support of SMEs in Ireland. As we shall see below, industrial policy in 
Ireland has mostly been geared towards FDI and it could reasonably be argued 
that this has been at the expense of indigenous companies.  This has some 
similarities to Africa, where an adverse business environment (with little support 
from government agencies, the regulatory offices and the managers of state 
enterprises) is an additional impediment for small firms.   
 
Despite these apparent similarities, one key aspect missing in the African case is 
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the benefit of European integration in the form of the single market. When Ireland 
joined the Common Market, there were a lacuna of developed common policies 
outside the Common Agricultural Policy (which at the time absorbed three 
quarters of the EC budget). Over time, though, there have been two major ways 
in which EU economic integration has brought substantial opportunities for small 
firms: (i) through the Acquis Communautaire and (ii) through the benefits 
emanating from structural funding, particularly in the sphere of infrastructural 
development. The latter has brought significant benefit to Ireland.  Beyond the 
costs associated with the Acquis, it can generate many advantages to small 
firms in the medium to long run.  These firms will be able to benefit from the 
entire (completed) internal market of about 450 million consumers.   The Single 
Market and deregulation in the EU will also ameliorate cross border trade by 
small firms engaging in flexible specialisation. The Single Market can also be 
helpful in attracting market-seeking FDI, an element which is very much missing 
from the African case. 
 
From its post Second World War beginnings in the European coal and steel 
community, the EU has evolved into an integrated single market of 450 million 
people. Many of its member states have also adopted a common currency and a 
common monetary policy together with many other measures of deep political 
integration. Such far reaching integration is clearly beyond the capacities of SSA 
countries. However, there are substantial benefits, economic as well as political, 
even from the limited regional integration which some countries have attempted. 
There are also a few reasonably well functioning examples of integration in 
African countries, notably in Southern Africa. The emphasis in the more 
successful of these late integration projects has been less on trade integration 
but more on integration of transport as well as in other spheres of infrastructure. 
Over time these countries may be able to cooperate on monetary matters as well 
as on trade and investment. The possibilities of African economies to be able to 
benefit from the kind of assistance which Ireland received from the EU may not 
appear to be a practical proposition for African countries.  Yet it may not be 
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entirely fanciful.  Who is to say that to acknowledge the contribution of Afro-
Americans to building up modern United States, let alone to right the historic 
wrongs, a President Obama may not launch the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for 
African countries?  Such a plan should encourage regional integration on the 
E.U. pattern, leading ultimately to deep integration.  Even if such a grand vision 
does not materialise, the essential point is that ODA to African countries should 
be used to encourage regional integration to create a larger market for firms in 
participating countries as well as to provide funding for the development of 
regional infrastructure.  
 
4. Viewing Development in the Round: The need for a Holistic Approach to 
Policy 
Commonly adopted definitions of industrial policy are too narrow where the key 
focus, particularly in the past, has been on grant-aiding firms and intervention 
with respect to particular sectors, even with a more recent focus on policies 
focused directly at the promotion of R&D and innovation and/or FDI and SMEs.  
We argue that good practice industrial policy is in fact much more ‘holistic’ in its 
approach and focuses simultaneously on both demand and supply side factors of 
industrial development; on micro economics as well as macro economics.5   Such 
an approach is in line with that suggested by the ‘Culliton Report’ (1992) in the 
context of Irish industrial policy. Culliton (1992) emphasised provision of 
infrastructural needs; reform of the tax system; a re-focusing of the education 
and training system; increased funding for science and technology (coupled with 
greater involvement by industry in steering the use of these funds); and a greater 
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emphasis on technology acquisition. In so doing, the report stressed that the role 
of the industrial promotion agencies should be kept under review, and the 
desirability of fostering clusters of related industries building on ‘leverage points’ 
of national advantage was also highlighted.  
As for indigenous industry, Culliton saw the widespread existence of grants as 
being often counterproductive (the argument being that it encourages a hand-out 
mentality). In this vein, more emphasis should be placed on: the increased use of 
equity finance as opposed to non-repayable cash grants; an emphasis on the 
need for the expansion of the indigenous sector; a reorganisation of grant 
awarding agencies into two main agencies, one of which would address the 
needs of foreign-owned industries, the other the needs of indigenous ones.  
Culliton was also at pains to stress that the Irish Department of Industry and 
Commerce was overly focused on operational matters and needed to place 
industrial policy formulation and evaluation at the centre of its activities.  We 
argue that a ‘good practice’ definition of industrial policy includes all of these but 
also needs to emphasise other factors such as well functioning labour and credit 
markets, an appropriate macro-environment, and attempts to build consensus 
over appropriate policy direction.   
 
We broadly agree with Hitchens and Birnie (1992) in their commentary on 
evaluating the Culliton report that the real challenge is to try to weigh the 
importance of the above factors with regard to the overall ‘competitiveness 
problem’ (we would however be more inclined to see this as the industrial or 
economic development challenge).  With reference to improving competitiveness 
(or in our case industrial or economic development) the authors correctly point 
out that there is little point calling for the need to improve competitiveness  
“…without any satisfactory definition that can be operationalised” (p. 29).  They 
proceed to argue that “this lack of identification of its causes and hence effective 
solutions is an impediment to a satisfactory industrial development policy” (ibid).  
Therein of course lays the challenge for policymakers regardless of country.   
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Thinking back to Ireland’s less favourable times, the preface to the Culliton report 
(1992) opens its narrative with the following comment: “over the past six months 
we have considered industrial policy bearing in mind the 260,000 people who are 
unemployed. We have concluded that there are no short term solutions, no quick 
fixes and no soft options left” (p. 7). In addition, it notes; “Ireland’s economic 
problems are deep-rooted and persistent. Their resolution will require patience, 
determination and a fundamental re-appraisal of our strengths and weaknesses” 
(p. 7). 
Following on from this broad and holistic view of what industrial policy should 
comprise, in the Irish case we can identify a range of factors which played a 
significant part in Ireland’s recent ‘catch up’.  These include: 
(1) Currency devaluations in both 1986 and 1993 which were then locked into 
the single currency; the Euro’s post-2000 depreciation in turn benefited 
outward orientated states such as Ireland;  
(2) A series of corporatist social pacts from 1987 where trade unions limited 
wage increases in return for income tax cuts. These have allowed rapid 
growth without inflation rising too high and have also enabled rapid 
employment growth; 
(3) A rapid expansion in labour supply, in part through net in-migration.6 More 
widely, the demographic shifts Ireland has experienced are unique within 
the EU, with an even balance between natural growth and migration (Salt 
2005: 49)7; 
(4) An interventionist industrial policy which has targeted certain sectors for 
FDI but has also recognised the limitations of FDI-based growth and 
somewhat belatedly has sought to better link foreign plants with domestic 
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developing countries.  
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firms and has also tried to develop indigenous capabilities and 
improvements in entrepreneurship, labour skills and research and 
development. 
This analysis has implications for the design of industrial and other policies in 
other small, open and peripheral economies. We suggest that whilst important 
lessons may be learned, they may not be those picked up by mainstream 
commentators such as Sapir et al (2003).  Furthermore, it should be noted that a 
range of factors came together: some more by luck than by judgement, and that 
the Irish catch-up should have happened much earlier had it not been for 
previous policy mistakes, particularly at the macro-level (Bailey et al, 2007). 
Indeed, on the macroeconomic-side, stabilisation was an important part of finally 
‘getting things right’ in Ireland. By the mid-1980s, the fiscal deficit in Ireland had 
grown to over 12% of GDP and the public debt ratio was approaching 120%.  
The recognition of the need to address these imbalances led to both the social 
pacts after 1986 and a process of fiscal consolidation achieved by the 
government reducing expenditure; over the two year period 1988-1989, the ratio 
of expenditure to GDP was reduced by 9% (see Bailey et al, 2007). The pain of 
this adjustment was eased both by EU funding and an improved external 
environment with reduced interest rates and improving demand (Lynch, 2005).8 
Of key relevance, the impact of EU structural funding assistance starting in 1988 
should not be underestimated: one study suggests that the cumulative effects of 
funding may have been to raise the level of GDP by over 4 per cent (Schweiger 
and Wickham, 2005: 50). Another suggests at least approximately 0.5 of a 
percentage point to GNP growth during the 1990s (Barry et al, 2001: 549). In 
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 Quite why the Irish economy prospered at this time when the state pursued a very restrictive 
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investments (EC Commission 1991; McAleese 1990). Others have stressed the Lawson boom in 
Britain which raised demand for Irish products and fall of the oil-prices; "Irish policy makers were 
just lucky that their adjustment was carried out at a time when world growth became buoyant and 
world interest rates were falling" (Bradley et al. 1993). Kennedy (2001: 131-2) also suggests that 
growth in the US economy and the advent of the Single Market after 1993 were important factors. 
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other words, external funding gave Ireland just enough room to stabilise its 
economy and to make investments (especially in infrastructure) designed to 
boost competitiveness; this may be relevant for African economies in the context 
of overseas development assistance.  Similarly, in the Africa case, UNCTAD 
(2005; 34) notes that overseas development assistance (ODA) could trigger such 
a “growth process if it is focused on financing pro-growth public investment such 
as economic infrastructure”. 
In addition, in the Irish case, currency depreciations which took place in 1986 and 
1993 assisted Irish competitiveness; the latter in particular was a 10% 
depreciation which was then locked into Euro entry. Whilst there was a 
revaluation of the Punt before Euro entry in 1998, the depreciation of the Euro 
after its launch delivered a further 20% boost to Irish competitiveness given its 
external-orientation in trade towards non-Euro zone economies. That this did not 
feed through into higher inflation is in part due to the corporatist social pacts.  
Such corporatism has been a long-standing central feature of Irish economic 
policy, with the establishment of the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC) in 1973. As noted, by the early 1980s, Ireland faced a ‘crisis’ as the 
government had embarked on deficit-financed expenditure programmes after the 
oil price rise of the early 1980s (and indeed the early 1970s). The existing 
development strategy based on attracting FDI was also criticised for its failure to 
support domestic industry (Telesis, 1982; Culliton, 1992).  Trans-nationals 
responded to the crisis by cutting investment and repatriating profits, contributing 
to a deficit on the balance of payments amounting to around 10% of GNP. 
Meanwhile, unemployment rose to around 20% of the labour force.  
At this crisis point, the major political parties recognised that an expansionary 
fiscal policy was no longer an option for Ireland as a small open economy. A 
social consensus for change emerged.  Key to this was the proposal by the trade 
unions in 1984 for a coordinated approach involving restrictive income policies, 
or ‘partnership agreements’. Indeed, Kennedy (2001: 135) argued that without 
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partnership agreements, it is unlikely that unions would have tolerated a rise in 
the profit share of national income (see below). Developing a shared view of 
what needs to be done certainly seems to have been a key element in enabling 
the Irish catch-up.9   
Between 1988 and 2005 there were six social partnership agreements between 
government, unions and employers. The original programme was the 
Programme for National Recovery (PNR) which ran from 1987 to 1990.10 The 
PNR set out a strategy to raise competitiveness with four main components, 
which have been retained and developed over time in each of the subsequent 
partnership agreements with later agreements having broader coverage 
(including chapters on greater social inclusion, equality, enterprise culture, small 
business, agriculture, public service modernisation of and a commitment to 
support partnership at the enterprise level): 
 A commitment to reduce the level of public debt and maintain the internal 
and external stability of the Irish currency. This has focused on creating 
low inflation and interest rates and a positive climate for investors. From 
the mid 1990s onwards this has tied into the EU’s Maastricht Criteria and 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 Restraining wage rises in order to improve cost competitiveness. An 
incomes policy became an essential part of the ‘new development 
strategy’. Through the pacts the government has compensated for wage 
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 MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in Japan may have played a similar 
consensus-building role after the Second World War through to the 1980s (see Bailey and 
Sugden, 2007). 
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 The pattern applied in the PNR was followed in successive pacts. An NESC report evaluates 
past experience and lessons, and provides a focal point for negotiations. Social pacts provide a 
mechanism for monitoring implementation and evaluation of the programmes. The Central 
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representatives of the Government and the social partners. The CRC is supplemented by working 
groups as well as informal contacts between government and the social partners. Successive 
social pacts have broadened stakeholders involved in the negotiation as well as the focus of 
agreements. 
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restraint by lowering income taxes, although recently this has perhaps 
reached the limits of what is achievable. 
 To boost competitiveness, the pacts have included structural reforms in 
several areas such as industrial policy and taxation. The latter was seen 
as needing reform to encourage employment creation, being seen as 
biased towards capital and property. 
 Social justice has been seen as important and there have been 
improvements in welfare payments for the least well-off. 
The Irish experience, then, would suggest the importance of strong institutional 
arrangements in fostering sound economic performance and social cohesion 
around development objectives.  In addition to this, as Andreosso-O’Callaghan 
and Lenihan (2006) detail, a range of other factors came together to enable 
Ireland to catch up with other European economies, including: 
 A modern telecommunications network: Progression towards a modern 
telecommunications network was significantly helped by the decrease in 
telecommunications costs which subsequently reduced the real costs 
associated with firm location in a peripheral economy such as Ireland.  
 Human capital accumulation: In contrast to other peripheral host countries 
for foreign investment, Ireland had a relatively skilled (and English 
speaking) labour force. Yet it is worth noting that rapid economic growth in 
Ireland has taken place without much investment in innovation. By EU and 
international standards, and in spite of its relative current wealth, Ireland 
still suffers from a low R&D to GDP ratio (and/or R&D/GNP ratio). In 
contrast with one of the key lessons advocated by mainstream 
commentators, modern economic growth in Ireland does not owe much to 
innovation.  
 Competition policy and deregulation: The introduction of competition policy 
and deregulation in the early 1990s was important in terms of delivering 
on cost competitiveness for firms using Ireland as an export platform (see 
Braunerhjelm et al., 2000).  
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 A shift in the type of products being traded internationally: Geographical 
disadvantage may not count as heavily anymore. As Krugman outlined: 
“…changes in both the nature of what nations trade and in how they carry 
out that trade has shifted the balance of geographical advantage in a way 
that is favourable to Ireland” (Krugman 1997, 44).  
 
In referring to this well trodden ground regarding the Irish growth factors, we 
simply wish to highlight that there were many factors which contributed to the 
success of the Irish economy particularly from around 1994 onwards. The 
industrial policy approach adopted by the Irish government was only one feature 
in the myriad of factors which contributed to the Irish success story. Almost all of 
the factors alluded to above would have impacted to a very large extent on the 
Irish business environment at the time. We would still suggest (see below) that 
there may be potential for government intervention in the SME sector in small 
economies such as those in sub-Saharan Africa to lead to significant 
improvements in the key growth indicators of these countries.  
5. Using Foreign Direct Investment (and involvement) Intelligently 
It is recognised that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa, although 
increasing, are “still too limited in geographical coverage and focused on 
extractive industries to have a significant effect on employment creation and 
poverty alleviation” (UNCTAD, 2007; 1).  A key cause of this is the high degree of 
risk and poor business environment, which deters FDI. According to UNCTAD 
(2007; 46), these impediments include “(a) poor infrastructure, (b) high entry 
costs, (c) labour market constraints, (d) low investor protection, and (e) high 
taxes and a cumbersome tax system”.  On the tax front, UNCTAD (ibid) notes 
that a typical firm in sub-Saharan Africa pays the equivalent of 71% of its profits 
in taxes, some 15% percent higher than the second-highest rate, paid in Europe 
and Central Asia.   
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In contrast, FDI, notably from the United States, has been a major trigger for 
economic growth in Ireland.  Indeed, relative to the size of the economy, Ireland 
has one of the highest levels of FDI inflows in the world. Whilst successive Irish 
governments have welcomed FDI (industrialization by invitation) since the 1950s, 
from the early 1970s onwards the government approach shifted towards a 
greater emphasis on selectivity and careful targeting, with pharmaceutical and 
electronics especially targeted as possessing promising opportunities. These 
industries were ideal for peripheral locations in that they were characterised by 
relatively low transportation costs and high growth rates (Braunerhjelm et al, 
2000).  Furthermore, the US was targeted as the most probable market for such 
projects given the likely benefits that would accrue to US companies using 
Ireland as an export base within the EU. It is important to note that the promotion 
and assistance of particular sectors was well timed. For example, the extension 
by the Irish government of financial incentives to internationally traded services 
just as they were about to grow in importance was a particularly timely 
intervention. Later, during the 1990s, industrial clusters in such sectors began to 
develop which involved linkages, spillover and sub–supply relationships with 
SMEs (see below). There was also a demonstration effect in operation, whereby 
the positive experiences of foreign investors in Ireland stimulated further FDI.  If 
strategic targeting and a more focused approach to FDI was a key part of the 
‘success’ of FDI, this raises the question as to what sectors should small African 
countries now be targeting? 
Whilst the high levels of FDI were largely brought about by a corporate–friendly 
environment offering the lowest corporate tax rate in the EU, it should be noted 
that these tax breaks had existed for decades with limited impact on economic 
success; indeed the corporate tax rate on manufactured exports was zero form 
1957 to 1981, then 10% and later 12.5%. Furthermore, other European 
economies have had such rates without attracting such levels of US FDI – in part 
this may be because of the cultural links between Ireland and the US where 
many US citizens can trace their ancestry back to Ireland, a factor which cannot 
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be replicated or seen as a ‘lesson’ for others.  In a similar vein, House and 
McGrath (2004) note that the emphasis on education and training and the 
favourable corporate tax environments were both already in place before the 
mid-1980s when the economy was still stagnant (ibid.). 
Of particular note was the recognition by the Irish government in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s that foreign transnationals were in effect branch plant operations 
and that the policy of heavily subsidising FDI was producing little in the way of 
wider spillovers for the economy. Because of this, policy began to adopt an even 
more selective approach to FDI, focusing more on high-tech and higher value 
added firms. Transnational firms’ motivations for FDI in Ireland shifted at this 
time, towards accessing the single market and access to skilled labour.   
It should be noted that problems and challenges remain and that the picture of 
FDI-induced ‘transformation’ is challenged by some.  As Honohan and Walsh 
(2002) noted: “the huge profits recorded by the Irish affiliates have very little to do 
with the manufacturing activities being conducted in Ireland. The low labor 
shares in value added should not be interpreted as truly implying high economic 
productivity of the labor and physical capital employed by the enterprise in 
Ireland”.   A key ‘lesson’, as we shall see below in more detail, would actually be 
that spillovers from FDI are not generated automatically and that an industrial 
policy that targets and positions FDI is vital to ensure wider spillovers and to 
benefit the domestic sector.  The case is not anti-FDI per se; rather, we 
recognise the value of high-quality FDI in assisting economic development. 
Rather, it needs to be stressed that this should not come at the expense of 
ignoring domestic firms.  In a related vein, Buckley et al (2006) argue that the 
contribution of transnationals to the Irish economy can also be overestimated by 
failing to take account of the following: the high level of imports (including 
payments for patents, royalties and other tangible inputs) and repatriated profits.  
Citing the work of Keating (2000), the authors show that “…sales amounted to 
€72 billion in 2004.  However, when imports of €43 billion and profit repatriation 
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of €19 billion are deducted the direct contribution to GNP is only 10 billion” 
(Buckley et al 2006: 2).  
Attracting high-quality FDI and positioning it seems crucial. Here, lessons with 
FDI experiences in peripheral regions of the EU seems highly relevant in taking 
on board elements of ‘good practice’. This includes targeting strategic sectors 
and linking FDI to cluster development, building trust with local managers in 
order to try to upgrade local plants, undertaking sector specific research on the 
strengths and weaknesses of local industry, providing aftercare support, targeting 
financial assistance at specific upgrading needs (e.g. investment in R&D rather 
than general support), and the monitoring of performance (see Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995; Bailey et al 1999).  The Irish experience of selectively targeting 
FDI seems very relevant here and raises the issue more generally of using 
selective as well as horizontal industrial policy.11   
 
The discussion of this section will be seriously incomplete without reference to 
the fact that in the practice of industrial policy in East Asia, both Japan and South 
Korea discouraged FDI rather than to seek it.  Singh (1995) noted that among 
developing countries, the Republic of Korea was second only to India in its low 
reliance on FDI inflows.  Foreign capital stocks totalled just 2.3 per cent of GNP 
in 1987 for the Republic of Korea, above the 0.5 per cent estimate for India, but 
far below the levels of 5.3 per cent for Taiwan Province of China, 17 per cent for 
Hong Kong, a massive 87 per cent for Singapore, 10 per cent for Brazil and 14 
per cent for Mexico (UN, 1993).  In the view of the World Bank economists, this 
discouragement was a self-imposed handicap, which was compensated for by 
the fact that both countries remained open to foreign technology through 
licensing and other means (East Asian Miracle, p.21).  Singh noted that World 
Bank economists did not ask the question: if the governments of Japan and the 
                                       
11
 See Bailey and Cowling (2007) who note that industrial policy in the US and Japan has 
involved both vertical measures in targeting new technologies and emerging industries, and 
horizontal measures to support all industries, suggesting that the current focus in Britain and the 
EU with the horizontal aspects of industrial policy has been largely misplaced. 
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Republic of Korea were as efficient and flexible in their economic policy as they 
themselves suggested (to account for their long-term, overall economic success), 
why did they persist with this apparently wrong-headed approach for so long? 
 
An alternative interpretation is that the approach was perhaps not so wrong-
headed after all.  It was “functional” within the context of the overall industrial 
policies which the two countries were pursuing.  First, it would have been difficult 
for MITI or the authorities of the Republic of Korea to use “administrative 
guidance” to the same degree with foreign firms as they were able to do with 
domestic ones.  Secondly, as UN (1993) rightly emphasized, there was a link 
between the national ownership of large firms and their levels of investment in 
research and development.  The Republic of Korea had, in relative terms, by far 
the largest expenditure on R&D among developing countries: 1.9 per cent of 
GNP in 1988, compared with 1.2 per cent for Taiwan Province of China (1988), 
0.9 per cent for India (1986) and Singapore (1987), 0.5 per cent for Argentine 
(1988), 0.6 per cent for Mexico (1984) and 0.4 per cent for Brazil (1985).  Korea’s  
performance in this area outstripped that of many developed countries- for 
example Belgium (1.7 per cent in 1987), Denmark (1.5 per cent in 1987) and Italy 
(1.2 per cent in 1987).  It was, of course, still below that of industrial super-
powers, Japan (2.8 per cent in 1987) and Germany (also 2.8 per cent in 1987). 
 
Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stressed another important advantage of the policy of 
mainly rejecting foreign investment as a means of technology transfer.  This, he 
argued, automatically placed on the enterprise the full responsibility for 
assimilating imported technology.  This was far more likely to lead to total system 
improvements and broader spill-overs than the “turn-key plant” mode of import or 
the foreign subsidiary mode.   
 
It is important to emphasize that Japan and South Korea’s rejection of FDI did 
not mean that these countries are not interested in importing foreign technology.  
Quite the contrary.  Japan after all has been attempting to obtain technology from 
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abroad for a hundred years.  The reason why it did not favour FDI as a source of 
technology was that it was inter alia comparatively much more expensive than 
licensing. The latter was a policy pursued by Japan up to the 1980s, when under 
pressure from the US it began finally to dismantle such barriers and started to 
allow in FDI without requiring a Japanese joint venture partner (Bailey and 
Sugden, 2007). 
 
The above considerations may also be valid for at least some SSA countries who 
may also prefer to import technology through licensing rather than through the 
medium of FDI. 
 
6. Indigenous Firms and Domestic Entrepreneurship 
Some commentators, such as Bailey et al (2007), have argued that the Irish 
government, on recognising the limitations of solely focusing on FDI as an engine 
of growth, also sought to develop indigenous small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurship more generally. Whilst acknowledging 
the merits of this opinion, we would also suggest that the focus on indigenous 
SMEs and entrepreneurship by Irish policymakers should have come much 
earlier.  Despite the fact, as outlined by Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan 
(2006: 282), that “…even as far back as 1979, some 95 per cent of all 
manufacturing units could be classified as SMEs”, it is nevertheless quite 
astonishing that there was no formal focus by the Irish government on the small 
firms sector per se until 1994 with the publication of ‘The Task Force on Small 
Business Report’ (1994). This was followed a year later by the EU driven ‘Small 
Business Operational Programme’ (1995). The ‘SME story’ in Ireland is an 
indigenous one as a majority of all indigenous firms in Ireland are classified as 
SMEs.   
One could justifiably argue that the Irish government to a large degree 
overlooked the indigenous (largely SME sector) until the mid 1990s. As such, this 
represents a key policy ‘failure’ and should be avoided by small African states.   
Admittedly, in the Irish case there were grants available to indigenous firms to 
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start-up and expand - but the focus on indigenous and SME firms was over-
shadowed by the prime focus by the Irish government on FDI. This is evident in 
comments from various reviews of industrial policy over the decades; most 
notably the ‘Telesis Group’ (1980), which highlighted an over-emphasis on 
foreign industry.  The Culliton report noted above also emphasised the need to 
expand the indigenous sector, noting that “the focus instead must shift decisively 
to indigenous companies. The view of… Porter and his colleagues…is that in 
Ireland the shift has been “too little too late” and that there has not been a full 
commitment to the slow process of developing a broader base of indigenous 
firms” (p. 67). However, it was not until the ‘Task Force on Small Business 
Report’ published in 1994 that the focus on the SME sector by Irish policy 
makers truly began in earnest.   
Some of the problems facing small firms in Ireland are similar, albeit in a much 
more intense form, in Africa, most notably the issue of access to finance. As 
UNCTAD (2007; 15) notes, this is especially the case for the small domestic 
enterprises in the informal sector that represent the vast majority of firms. Indeed, 
it is thought that firms in sub-Saharan Africa fund between one half and three 
quarters of their new investments from their informal savings. In order to address 
this, microfinance systems have emerged in recent years in order to rectify some 
of the shortcomings of the financial system in Africa. 
 
More generally, Acs et al (2007) suggest that entrepreneurs in Ireland are held in 
high esteem, and that this has been beneficial for the economy. This is 
questionable. Indeed, Culliton (1992) highlighted “…the negative attitude towards 
enterprise that is prevalent in this country” (p. 22) and proceeded to outline “…a 
deep-rooted prejudice against failure in business.  The stigma that attached to a 
failed enterprise very often inhibits the individual from ever trying again” (p. 22).  
Perhaps it could be argued that such a negative attitude no longer exists.  
However, ten years later from Culliton, Goodbody Economic Consultants (2002), 
although acknowledging an improvement, still noted that the “non-acceptance of 
‘failure’, both on the part of financial institutions and the general public is still 
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perceived to be an issue by Irish entrepreneurs” (p. iv).  They do however, admit 
that “these attitudes are somewhat at variance with recent international studies 
which indicate that the general public’s attitude towards entrepreneurship in 
Ireland is now highly favourable” (p. iv).   
 
 
7. Spillovers, Linkages and Clusters 
There was a general belief, hope and anticipation in Irish industrial policy circles 
that indigenous SMEs would ‘… grow from foreign firms through linkages and 
spillovers’ (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006: 280).  The  spillover 
argument is often used by governments to justify subsidies for FDI, but such 
spillovers are not guaranteed. It is to this issue that we now turn, asking how 
successful (where they existed) were Irish Government policy interventions in 
achieving successful linkages and spillovers between incoming transnationals 
and indigenous (largely SME) firms?  This is significant as some see this link as 
a key element of the Irish ‘success story’. For example, Pike et al in their well-
balanced review of local and regional development (2006; 233) suggest that: 
‘the role of industrial policy… seems important, with the Irish state and its 
governance institutions proving adept at providing the kinds of territorial assets 
that attract the sorts of TNCs that will contribute to development. Ireland may 
provide an example of a somewhat ‘strategic coupling’ between domestic and 
foreign owned firms…’. 
 
The wider FDI literature tells us that, if present, positive spillovers from 
transnationals can lead to increases in the productivity of domestic firms.  This 
can happen via three main routes: (1) demonstration effects; (2) competition 
effects, and; (3) labour market effects.  As noted, spillovers are not an automatic 
occurrence but are in essence driven by the characteristics of the host economy, 
such as its degree of economic development, its ability to assimilate imported 
technology and more generally its absorptive capacity (see Blomström and 
Kokko, 1996 and Blomström et al. 2000).  In this section we briefly highlight the 
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key evidence regarding the prevalence such linkages and spillovers in Ireland.  
Most notably, despite the rhetoric of ‘FDI-led adjustment’, there is significant 
evidence to suggest that the Irish economy operates according to a Lewis-type 
dualism “…with little relationship / interdependence between MNEs and (local 
enterprises) and each developing according to its own pattern” (Ugur and Ruane, 
2004: 3). As such, each sector appears to have developed according to its own 
pattern. Such problems of ‘dualism’ remain a major problem in many developing 
economies; for example UNCTAD (2007;6) notes that in Africa, FDI is 
“…relatively volatile and tends to focus on extractive industries with very few 
linkages to the domestic economy”.   
 
In the Irish case, there is evidence from some sectors at least of improved 
linkages over time, such as in electronics (see Görg and Ruane, 2000; 2001), 
even if foreign (particularly large) firms have lower linkages – perhaps due to the 
necessary scale needed to supply such firms (ibid.). Other authors (e.g., Kearns 
and Ruane, 2001) suggest that the level of R&D activity in a plant is a key 
determinant with regards to firstly, lengthening the duration over which that plant 
will stay in Ireland and secondly with respect to improving the quality of the 
employment generated in the plant. For high-technology sectors, the evidence of 
spillover effects is even more evident (Görg and Strobl, 2002; 2003; Barry and 
Van Egeraat, 2008). Here, there is evidence to suggest that the presence of 
transnationals in high-technology sectors has had a “life-enhancing” effect on 
indigenous plants in Ireland,  improved indigenous entry rates, and has improved 
links between manufacturers and components suppliers in sectors such as IT. 
 
Other contributions  (e.g. from  Heanue and Jacobson, 2003; Forfás  2004; 
Lenihan and Sugden, 2008) have also explored the issue of linkages in Ireland. 
Lenihan and Sugden (2008) argue that the National Linkages Programme 
introduced in 1985 was partly in response to criticism of an industrial policy 
approach by Irish government that relied on transnationals and was subsequently 
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restructured by Enterprise Ireland with a focus surrounding the issue of the 
globalization of local supply industry.  This approach resulted in a move towards 
the building of supply networks and chains as opposed to actual direct local 
company linkages. Forfás (2004) in analyzing the impact of the National 
Linkages Programme argued that it stopped short of reaching its potential, while 
Heanue and Jacobson (2003) argued that there was some success up to the 
1990s but thereafter the impact was insignificant.  In terms of more traditional 
sectors, Culliton (1992: 31) argued that only a small proportion of potential 
linkages between foreign and traditional firms were being realized; and that “[i]n 
general,…. policy to promote industrial linkages has not lived up to its 
expectations. It is only a mild exaggeration to say that most of the newer foreign 
firms operate here as essentially an industrial enclave” (ibid.). The overall 
conclusion on the success or otherwise of linkages in Ireland is succinctly 
summed up by Ruane (2001) when she concludes that “it is hard to either totally 
prove or disprove” whether linkage policies have been successful. 
A more detailed example can be seen in the case of the IT sector. This is of 
particular importance in the Irish case, as software firms have been regularly 
cited by commentators within and beyond Ireland as one of the most successful 
examples of FDI spillovers (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006).  
Buckley et al (2006) outline that the majority of foreign and domestic firms in the 
software industry in Ireland are located in the same region.  Citing the work of 
Crone (2002), they outline that in excess of 70% of MNE subsidiaries and 87% of 
domestic firms are located in and around the greater Dublin area.  They proceed 
to argue that such a concentration of indigenous and foreign software firms in 
one area is likely to facilitate increased technology transfer between the two sets 
of firms.  Barry (1999) argued that software is an industry where one-third of all 
indigenous software firms have been started by ex-employees of transnationals.  
In a similar vein, in the case of the software industry in Ireland, evidence 
indicates that the vast majority of indigenous firms were founded by former 
employees of software and hardware transnationals (Buckley, 2005; Buckley et 
al., 2006).  More precisely, these authors outline that 44% of new venture 
 28 
founders were employed in software and hardware transnationals immediately 
prior to establishing their own enterprises.   
In explaining such trends, Buckley et al (2006) argue that a number of factors 
were likely to have contributed to the maximisation of productivity spillovers to 
the indigenous software industry in Ireland.  These include: (1) the fact that 
transnationals choosing Ireland could be described as technologically superior 
(i.e. they employed high end technologies); (2) the transnational software sector 
in Ireland is almost entirely export focused; (3) former transnational employees 
who subsequently went on to establish their own new ventures were key 
knowledge transfer agents to indigenous software firms; (4) the indigenous 
software firms demonstrated a high absorptive capacity, e.g. via a high degree of 
tertiary educated employees; (5) the clustering of indigenous and transnational 
firms; and (6) the indigenous software sector was enhanced by Irish government 
policies which focused on a reorientation of the education system in the 1980s 
with the objective of providing a pool of graduates for technology focused 
industries.  Point 5 in this list, the development of industry clusters, highlights a 
related – and to a degree a necessary precursor - to the maximization of FDI 
spillovers and linkages. Indeed, one of the key reasons for the promotion of 
cluster policy is so that firms located in particular clusters will engage in linkages 
and spillovers with each other.  
 
Accordingly, we now turn to the specific question of just how successful was the 
creation of clusters in Ireland?  A focus on creating sectoral and spatial clusters 
in Ireland really only began in earnest in the 1980s (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). 
Such efforts were focused around two key high technology sectors, namely, 
electronics and chemicals/pharmaceuticals.  More specifically, four segments of 
the electronics sector were targeted: microprocessors, software, computer 
products and printers.  In line with this strategy, some of the key players in these 
sectors, namely Intel and Microsoft, were attracted to establish operations in 
Ireland (ibid.).  With the location of such firms, and subsequently Hewlett Packard 
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in printing, Ireland to all purposes had an “electronics hub” and the “spokes” were 
soon populated by dozens of smaller enterprises (ibid. 1620).  Ireland could thus 
be said to have been a significant beneficiary of the formation of clusters 
(Krugman, 1997); with the presence of the above-named firms contributing to the 
average share of US FDI in electronics to Ireland increasing to 27 per cent 
between 1994 and 2001, compared to a rate of less than 12 per cent for Irish 
manufacturing as a whole (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). The two other key sectors 
where industrial clusters were created are the chemicals and pharmaceutical 
sectors, with these firms clustering primarily in the Cork region of Ireland.  
However, in contrast to experience in the electronics sector, where production 
linkages between firms developed, this was not the case with the chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals clusters.  Another cluster also developed in the medical devices 
sector.  The latter is concentrated in the west of Ireland, with many firms being 
attracted to locate there due to a favourable attraction policy by the Irish 
government (primarily in the form of high subsidy inducements).  This particular 
cluster is however less concentrated (when compared to the other clusters in 
Ireland) and the average size of business operating in the medical device cluster 
is also relatively small (Buckley and Ruane, 2006).   
 
In general, the empirical evidence on the impact of clusters in Ireland is, 
however, limited, with what evidence there is suggesting that there has been 
relatively little sectoral clustering between transnationals and local firms, at least 
in low-tech sectors and manufacturing overall (Gleeson et al, 2005; Buckley and 
Ruane (2006). As seen from the above discussion, there does however, appear 
to have been some clustering between transnationals and local firms in some 
high-tech sectors. As such, in concluding this brief discussion of the success or 
otherwise of cluster policy in Ireland (as part of the look at industrial policy more 
broadly), it seems that the prevailing evidence (where it exists) is mixed and 
inconclusive-and warrants further examination. The Irish government (Report of 
the Small Business Forum, 2006) has recognised, however, that as more low-
value-added activities migrate to lower-cost countries, a greater proportion of 
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GNP will have to be produced by indigenous firms (predominantly SMEs). Other 
reports commissioned by the Irish government (e.g. a study by Goodbody 
Economic Consultants, 2002) have also focused on the importance of 
entrepreneurship and more specifically on eliminating the barriers to 
entrepreneurship in Ireland.  Whilst welcoming this focus, we would argue that 
this should have come much earlier in Ireland’s development, and we see this as 
an important ‘lesson’ for other states as they look for lessons to be learned in 
terms of industrial policy trajectory.  
 
This review only serves to reiterate our point that a holistic industrial policy needs 
to account for the limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth and hence also 
promote measures to grow domestic capacity, and to deliver a variety of growth 
‘drivers’ for the economy.  It is fair to say that the limitations of FDI-led growth 
have been increasingly (if belatedly) recognised, and Ireland is now recognised 
to be vulnerable due to the downturn in the US economy, given its overwhelming 
reliance on US-based FDI. As such, at this critical period, Ireland faces 
increasing competition for FDI from emerging economies, and Ireland is no 
longer a cheap country in which to do business, due to rises in wages and raw 
material costs. Whilst this has been realised, a more holistic approach to policy 
development at the outset could have avoided some of the problems we 
identified above, thereby enhancing economic development, a point which small, 
peripheral economies elsewhere may wish to note. 
 
The discussion of this section and the last will again be incomplete without 
reference to the role of large indigenous firms in the development process.  In 
many countries, such firms which are large by developing countries standards 
but rather puny in international terms are the spearheads of spreading technical 
change and productivity growth.  Amsden (1989) is the leading exponent of the 
critical role of large indigenous firms in late industrialization.  What is, therefore, 
required in industrial policy for developing countries is the right balance between 
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the promotion of large and small firms.  To illustrate this point, Indian industrial 
policy in the period 1950 to 1980 is an example of a policy which encouraged 
small firms at the expense of large firms in order primarily to safeguard 
employment.  Despite its good economic rationale, this policy is generally 
regarded as being a failure as it stopped the growth of large firms and thwarted 
their role in the development process. See further Joshi and Little (1994), 
(Ahluwalia (1992) and Singh (forthcoming).  
 
8. Policy Evaluation 
In view of the types of market failures that are likely to arise in the SME sector 
noted above (e.g. the finance gap), a realistic route to help improve the efficiency 
of such markets is through the services provided by industrial development 
agencies. The extent to which development agencies in Ireland have produced 
the expected effects is an issue of significant and ongoing debate. One key issue 
that emerged in discussions (particularly pertaining to the 1990s) is that of 
agency duplication of services provided.
 
The Industrial Evaluation Unit (1999) 
found that around 39 per cent of firms that received support from more than one 
agency took up such support within the same time period. The prime lesson to be 
learned in this regard is that the support environment provided by government to 
firms needs to be clearly targeted and focused in its delivery. A clear underlying 
rationale for a specific type of intervention should be provided in all cases. 
 
One of the outcomes of EU funding in the case of Ireland is that over time there 
was increased pressure to engage in an evaluation of industrial policies (primarily 
to begin with for reasons of accountability). Indeed, guidelines from the European 
Commission (EC) as a result of Ireland being a Structural Fund beneficiary were 
definitely a key driving force behind the much greater emphasis placed on 
evaluation in Irish policy from the early 1990s onwards.  This is outlined by 
Andreosso O’ Callaghan and Lenihan (2006) in the context of the New EU 
Member States, but here we argue that the same issues are also pertinent to 
small African states. A number of possible strategies can be adopted in the 
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context of industrial policy evaluation (options 1-3 are not mutually exclusive and 
a mixed approach is possible):  
 
1. Wait until pressure comes from outside to evaluate. In Ireland’s case this was 
from the EU.  In the case of the African economies, the impetus may come from 
agencies providing overseas development aid. This was the stance largely 
adopted by Ireland from around 1993 onwards;  
2. Familiarise themselves with ‘best practice’ or at least ‘good practice’ evaluation 
frameworks and methodologies adopted internationally
 
(reflecting on the key 
issues learned) so that they are in a position to know ‘how’ (deciding on the 
methodological approach to be adopted is one of the key challenges for 
evaluators) to evaluate when requested to do so by external donors or 
organisations ; 
3. View evaluation as a useful tool in its own right. This would involve adopting a 
proactive approach whereby evaluation would take place at the three stages of 
the industrial policy process: policy formulation (ex–ante evaluation focusing on 
the market failure argument as a rationale for intervention and fundamental 
economic principles such as opportunity cost); policy implementation; and policy 
accountability (ex–post evaluation) (Rist 1995). Such an approach not only sees 
evaluation as something that must be undertaken due an external pressure (e.g. 
donor or funder) but rather sees evaluation as a worthwhile activity in terms of 
lessons to be learned that can subsequently be incorporated into future policy 
interventions.  There is no doubt that many would regard evaluation as a ‘luxury’ 
in African economies where resources are already scarce.  We would argue 
however, that if robust evaluations are carried out (which ask the right questions 
relating to issues such as deadweight, displacement12, multipliers and linkages) 
this may lead to improved future industrial policy interventions which in the long 
run could prove to be extremely cost effective and efficient.  Clearly, this is an 
area that merits further investigation.   
                                       
12
 For a discussion of the concepts and estimation of deadweight and displacement, in the 
context of Ireland, see Lenihan (1999 and 2004) and Lenihan and Hart (2004). 
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Ireland should certainly not be regarded as a role model in the context of  
industrial policy evaluation, having hovered around option 1 for most of the 
1990s, although of late, it is certainly getting nearer to option 3. This is 
highlighted by Lenihan et al (2005; 14), who argue that “the methodological rigor 
of Irish industrial policy evaluations has been improving in recent years”.   It was 
not until some pressure came from the European Commission that Irish policy 
makers and academics alike truly began take industrial policy evaluation 
seriously. This is somewhat difficult to comprehend given that an interventionist 
approach to industrial policy has been a feature of the industrial policy stance by 
successive governments in Ireland since the 1950s, with the first grant to firms 
actually being awarded as far back as 1952. The degree of subsidy intervention 
in the Irish case is aptly summed up by Lenihan et al (2005) when they show that 
over the period 1980-2003, in the region of €5.5 billion was provided by the four 
Irish development agencies in the form of grant payments and equity 
investments.  The key point is that any policy intervention should bring about a 
level of ‘additionality’ in excess of what would have happened if no such 
intervention had taken place (i.e. explore the counter–factual, which involves 
trying to assess what would most likely have happened if no intervention had 
taken place).  In this regard, Storey (2000) argues that a prerequisite to any 
evaluation is that clear objectives be specified. More precisely, he highlights the 
“…impossibility of conducting an evaluation in the absence of clearly specified 
objectives for the policy concerned” (p. 177).  This calls for a clearly defined set 
of policy objectives from the outset, and to allow for ‘trail and error’ as an 
important part of policy development. As UNCTAD (2007; 87) notes, referring in 
particular to East Asian experience: 
“A simple replication of the East Asian developmental State, even of there were 
such a thing, would not do.  As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as the East 
Asian model of a developmental State that could be recommended to Africa.  
Indeed, the intrinsic differences among the Asian experiences underscore the 
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importance of “trial and error” as an important ingredient of policy formulation and 
implementation in developmental States.  This process should benefit from 
constant monitoring and the feeding of the lessons learnt from monitoring into 
new policies to overcome earlier shortcomings”.  
Given some of the failures (as well as successes) of ‘traditional’ Japanese 
industrial policy (see Bailey and Sugden, 2007), some may conclude that Katz 
(1998) is correct in arguing that ‘development state’ policies should be avoided.  
However, in a sense economies are always in a state of ‘development’; for us, 
the key is to adapt and tailor policies holistically to that stage of development. 
An additional challenge (as with all calls for evaluation) is who should actually 
carry out such evaluations. The follow-on question is who should evaluate the 
evaluators?  Clearly, in the face of the level of corruption and lack of resources to 
carry out some evaluations in some of the African economies, this issue is 
particularly pertinent.   
 
9.   Reflections on the East Asia ‘developmental State’13 
Is there an East Asian model?  This is a prior issue in considering the relevance 
of the East Asian developmental State to African countries.  In some academic 
circles, it has become customary to deny the existence of such a model and to 
argue that if it existed at all, it was not very successful.   Yet businessmen and 
men of affairs have no hesitation in identifying the “Asian way of doing business”.  
See for example Greenspan (1998).   Singh (1999) suggested that there would 
be general agreement on the following characteristics of the East Asian model:- 
 
1. The close relationship between the government and business where the 
government did not do anything without consulting business and vice 
versa. 
2. Many interventions were carried out through a system of ‘administrative 
                                       
13
 In writing this section we have borrowed passages from Singh (1999) and Singh and Weiss (1999). 
- 
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guidance’ rather than through formal legislation. 
3. The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in 
countries like Japan and Korea was also very different from that of the US  
and the UK. The former countries followed, for example, the so-called 
main bank system which involved long-term relationships between the 
corporations and the main banks. This enabled Japanese or Korean 
managers to take a long-term view in their investment decisions. The 
managers were not constrained by the threat of hostile take-overs on 
stock markets as in the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
4. There were differences in the internal organisation of East Asian 
corporations compared with those of the US and the UK. The former 
involved co-operative relationships between management and labour, 
epitomised by the system of lifetime employment. This implied 
considerable imperfections in the labour market. 
5. As for competition in product markets, such competition was not regarded 
by the East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in countries like 
the US, economic philosophy in the east Asian countries did not accept 
the dictum that “the more competition the better’. The government in these 
countries were of the view that, from the perspective of promoting 
investment and technical change, the optimal degree of competition was 
not perfect or maximum competition. The governments had therefore 
purposefully managed and guided competition: it had been encouraged 
but also restricted in a number of ways. 
6. Following this basic economic philosophy outlined above, the East Asian 
government sought not ‘close’ but what might be called ‘strategic’ 
integration with the world economy, i.e. they integrated up to the point 
where it was useful for them to do so. Thus during their high-growth 
development phase, Japan (between 1950 and 1973) and Korea (1970s 
and 1980s) integrated with the world economy in relation to exports but 
not imports; with respect to science and technology but not finance and 
multi-national investment (see Chakravarty and Singh (1988)).   
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The above is a characterisation of the East Asian model as an ideal type. Not all 
countries, or even Japan and Korea, have followed the model exactly at all times 
in the post-war period. As far as government-business relationships are 
concerned there is a continuum with the closest relationship to be found in 
Korea, and the least close in Thailand. Malaysia and Indonesia fall in between. 
Similarly, the main bank system worked differently in Korea compared with 
Japan. Unlike Japan, where the ‘main banks’ were by and large private entities, 
in Korea for much of the period these were directly state-controlled. Only in the 
recent period have they been privatised. Nevertheless, there is considerable truth 
in the view that the Asian way of doing business and the institutional structures it 
has generated are rather different from those of countries like the US and the UK 
(Greenspan, 1998; Summers, 1998). 
 
With respect to the application of the model to African countries, as noted earlier, 
UNCTAD (2007; 87) did not regard a simple replication as being very useful.  
However, in line with Chang (2006), it is the case that East Asian countries, with 
the exception of Hong Kong, have at different times used a wide range of 
industrial policy measures with considerable success. Pulling together this variety 
of experiences, Chang (2006) argues that the success of industrial policy 
critically depends on how it is designed and implemented, and he highlights five 
main points from East Asian experience: 
 
1. The selection of target industries need to be realistic and related both to the 
country’s technological capabilities and world market conditions. The success of 
East Asian countries “owe a lot to the fact that they did not attempt to make too 
big a step” (Chang, 2006; 126). 
 
2. Industrial policy needs to be closely integrated with an export strategy, 
especially in small economies. For example, scale economies cannot be 
achieved without entering the export market early on. This in turn brings us back 
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to the relevance of the Single Market for Ireland in providing a wider market. 
 
3. The government needs to discipline the recipients of the rents it creates 
through the use of tariffs, subsidies etc in order to compensate for the loss of 
market discipline. 
 
4. The implementing bureaucracy needs to be both competent and politically 
insulated. Chang stresses that East Asian countries do not have any particular 
cultural advantage which leads to good bureaucracies. This is due only to 
continuous effort.   
 
5. Close interaction between the government and private sector is necessary 
without the former becoming hostage to the latter.  On this, Chang refers to 
Evans’ (1995) use of the term ‘embedded autonomy’ to reflect the needs for both 
roots in society but also its own will and power. In this vein, Bailey and Sugden 
(2006) suggest that where Japanese industrial policy started to ‘go wrong’ was 
when it was effectively captured by giant firms for their own benefit. Recognising 
and avoiding such dangers seems crucial to enable policy to function for a public 
rather than a private benefit.   
 
 
10. Concluding Thoughts 
As outlined in this paper, there are indeed some interesting similarities and 
lessons to be learned (both good and bad) by the smaller African economies 
from the Irish industrial policy (and other) experiences.  Key amongst these is the 
concern expressed in this paper that industrial policy should not be seen purely 
in narrow terms, that is with a sole focus on attracting FDI.  We argue here that 
there is need for a more ‘holistic’ approach to economic development which inter-
alia focuses on the development of domestic entrepreneurship and indigenous 
firm expansion more generally as well as emphasising the importance of other 
supply side factors (e.g. infrastructure; well functioning labour markets).  This 
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more all-encompassing view of industrial policy and economic development may, 
it could be argued, take a longer time to materialise. This is a difficult position for 
the African economies to be faced with given the extremely high levels of  
poverty and deprivation witnessed in many of these small African economies.  
We do however, argue that such a ‘holistic’ growth trajectory could lead to a 
more sustainable industrial development path, in contrast to the current situation 
in Ireland whereby the recent down turn in the US economy has sent shock 
waves through the Irish economy given its (over)dependence on US firms.14  
 
This paper has provided some novel insights by providing a comparison between 
Ireland and the small African economies.  To our knowledge such a comparison 
has not been carried out heretofore.  As acknowledged in this paper, when 
comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken place, 
it tends to be vis-a-vis the East Asian experience (which, as seen above, 
undoubtedly also provides interesting economic development insights but with 
certain caveats). 
 
The paper suggests that a very important contribution of the Irish model is its 
emphasis on corporatism rather than simply state direction in the operation of 
industrial policy.  The Irish model is also in a sense more democratic and  has 
protected workers’ rights during the development process than the highly 
dirigisite East Asia model.  In relation to the small size of the African economies, 
the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient ODA for infrastructural 
development. 
 
We conclude here by making the point that some immediate actions are needed 
for example with respect to the financial system in the African economies.  A 
                                       
14
 Even as far back as 1989, there were 307 US companies located in Ireland.  Ten years later  in 
1999, the number of US companies located in Ireland still stood at 288.  Whereas, the most 
recent year for which data is available (2006) shows that the total number of US companies has 
increased to 470 (with these 470 companies employing 95,515 people).  In fact, in 2001, the 
number of US companies reached a peak at 531.  This information is derived from the combined 
sources of UNCTAD WID (2005) Country Profile Ireland and various Annual Report from IDA 
Ireland (various years).   
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poorly functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low 
levels.15 It is also important to bear in mind that the various small African 
economies each face their own industrial and economic development challenges, 
therefore we do not suggest a ‘one size fits all’ approach.  As outlined by 
UNCTAD (2007), referring to East-Asian experience, the path to sustainable 
growth and development is derived from “a pragmatic mix of markets and state 
action, taking into account the country-specific development challenges” 
(UNCTAD, 2007; 61). It concludes: 
 
“The challenge for Africa (as for other developing countries), therefore, is 
not how to copy any model, but how to create “capitalisms” adaptable to 
the unique opportunities and development challenges in each country…” 
(UNCTAD, 2007; 88).   
 
 
                                       
15
On the development of stock markets and banks in Africa, see further Singh (1999b) and Singh 
(forthcoming) 
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